POSTMODERN (UN)ENDINGS. THE SUBJECT AND INFINITY IN MODERN AND POSTMODERN LITERATURE by Simoniti, Jure
200 
 





POSTMODERN (UN)ENDINGS. THE SUBJECT AND INFINITY  




Faculty of Arts  




Key words: classical novel, modernist novel, postmodernist novel, narrative, ending. 
 
Abstract: The paper explores the possible endings of narratives in the classical 
European novel from Cervantes through Goethe to Flaubert and the twentieth-century 
modernist novel of Proust, Kafka, Joyce, Beckett, and García Márquez. Against this 
background, the twenty-first-century novel The Pianist’s Touch [Pianistov dotik] by 
Mirt Komel is interpreted. The thesis is that the European novel has grown 
progressively incapable of bringing the story to a close: in Kafka, the castle is never 
to be reached, in Proust, the infinite Time itself incarnates, in Beckett, the flow of 
words never comes to an end, and in García Márquez, the ending is only a fulfillment 
of a prophecy in which we are eternally caught. It is the modernist collapse of the 
symbolic structure of the world that condemns the hero to this kind of “narrative 
infinity.” By contrast, in Komel’s novel the symbolic frame of reality has never 
existed, which is why the world no longer addresses, interpellates or obliges the 
protagonist, but rather lets him be apotheosized into a transcendent element in the 
midst of the immanence of the world. 
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Povzetek: Članek raziskuje možne konce naracij v klasičnem evropskem romanu od 
Cervantesa mimo Goetheja do Flauberta in v modernističnem romanu dvajsetega 
stoletja pri Proustu, Kafki, Joyceu, Beckettu in Garcíi Márquezu. Skozi to perspektivo 
je podana interpretacija romana enaindvajsetega stoletja Pianistov dotik Mirta 
Komela. Teza se glasi, da je evropski roman postajal vse bolj nesposoben, da bi 
zgodbo pripeljal do zaključka: pri Kafki ni mogoče doseči gradu, pri Proustu se utelesi 
neskončni Čas sam, pri Beckettu tok besed nikoli ne pride do konca, pri Garcíi 
Márquezu je konec le izpolnitev prerokbe, v katero smo vselej že ujeti. Razlog, ki 
junaka obsoja na takšno »narativno neskončnost«, leži v modernističnem sesutju 
simbolne strukture sveta. V nasprotju s tem pa v Komelovem romanu simbolni okvir 
realnosti nikoli ni obstajal, zato svet junaka ne interpelira in zavezuje več, temveč ga 




1 Introduction  
 
The “end of history” is arguably the most notorious, exploited, criticized, 
and sometimes misunderstood of the Hegelian notions2. And Hegel’s 
philosophy might well be the last historical stance that could still proclaim 
the existence of “objective Spirit,” which is, among other things, an 
institution of a guaranteed ending to any possible story. After his death, it is 
this “warranted closure” that seems to have become impossible. Somewhere 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, a certain tendency in philosophy, 
as well as science, begins to manifest itself and prevail, a tendency to invent 
terms of a kind of unending, fatalistic repetitiveness of being. In the wake of 
post-Hegelian spirit, Marx developed a series of concepts of self-referential 
automatism, such as the circulation and self-expansion of capital. Nietzsche 
was famously subject to the great revelation of the eternal recurrence of the 
same, an experience which he cherished as the most momentous insight of 
his life. In the twentieth century, Freud, in his “last dualism,” juxtaposed life 
drives with cyclical and inherently infinite death drives; this doctrine is 
widely held to be the climax of his scientific career. Heidegger’s late thought 
introduced the fateful truth-events which no longer adhere to the “subjective” 
logic of narrative closures. Lacan defined drive as essentially non-reducible 
                                                                
2 Even though a benevolent reading could still “save” it by re-interpreting it into an intrinsically 
modern idea, for it was invented as an opposition to the “bad infinities” of Kant and Fichte. 
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to desire and derived the concept of jouissance precisely from this iterative, 
unremitting, anti-humanist force in the core of human sexuality. Deleuze 
based his entire ontology on the notion of repetition, drawing heavily on 
Marx’s circulation and Freud’s death drive. And Luhmann’s sociology, his 
“systems theory,” is centered around the reproduction of the system, whose 
only immanent desire is never to come to an end. In short, by all appearances 
the closed horizons of metaphysics were slowly resigning and making place 
for an altogether new “discomfort” of possible endings eternally eluding the 
human condition. 
And it was perhaps literature that developed the most delicate and 
sophisticated sensitivity for this modernist “terror of non-finitability.” A 
certain not to be generalized although clear enough trend can be observed. 
While the nineteenth-century novel could still guarantee the form of the “end 
of the story,” the following period would begin to deny us even this hindmost 
solace, the solace of great tragic, but nonetheless determinate and finalized 
fates. In this paper, we would therefore like to embark on an exploration of 
the modern emergence of what we term “narrative infinity.” For we will argue 
that the most representative literary works of the previous century, novels 
written by Kafka, Proust, Beckett, and García Márquez, are either incapable 
of constructing an ending or can only bring the narrative to a close where the 
impossibility of a true ending becomes self-referential and eventually 
incarnates in an image of infinity circling back into itself. Our ruminations 
on the different ways of ending a novel arose upon reading a twenty-first 
century novel, The Pianist’s Touch by Mirt Komel, in which, as we shall see, 
a sort of total novelistic non-finitability permeates every layer of its narrative 
world.  
 
2 From the clasical endings to the modernist non-finitability 
 
The beginnings and the ends of novels are never an innocent affair; the 
first sentence plunges us into a hitherto unknown universe, the last expels us 
from it, leaving an aftertaste of a world accomplished. And one perhaps 
particularly compelling and economical way to enquire into the most 
pervasive changes of the entire literary space is to focus precisely on these 
opening and closing moves. 
Let us re-read the initial paragraph of The Pianist’s Touch, Komel’s 2015 
debut novel, and ask ourselves how does it differ from the beginnings that 
we, as readers, are accustomed to: 
 
Darkness. A timeless, colorless, weightless, sick emptiness without 
me, you, him, or anyone or anything else. No matter. Soon after, a not 
quite inevitable unconscious movement of the body, then the waking 
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of consciousness: pain, brightness, pain, emptiness, pain–voices. 
One’s own griping and groaning. The heart is beating, breathe, the 
blood is flowing, breathe, the wound is healing, breathe. Light 
(Komel, 2015: 11; hereafter translation T. D.). 
 
The usual scheme of classic novels – especially the nineteenth-century 
realist novel – is the one which opens with an image of a ready-made world 
and then locates the protagonist in its midst. Here, on the other hand, it seems 
as though we are witnessing cosmic creation tout court. Although we later 
find out that this scene is about the protagonist waking up in hospital from a 
coma he fell into in the middle of the street, it is also evident that the first 
sentence of the paragraph – “Darkness” – as well as the last one –“Light”– 
allude to ancient creation myths, in particular the biblical Genesis. With this 
move, the author pulls the rug of safe traditional narrative forms from under 
our feet and makes us follow the tracks of a somewhat more inscrutable logic 
of creation. And the coordinates of this opening are set so firmly that they 
will not let us out of their clutches until the very last page. Already at the end 
of the first chapter, the author hints with a refined, Nabokovian irony that the 
novel will not follow the traditional narrative structure and honor its pledge 
by imparting an ending to the story: 
 
At this point, as an intermediate conclusion, merely an interjection 
intended for the rather more sensitive reader, and in the face of all 
those who judge a book by its ending and rush towards the final page: 
rest assured that the book will not end with the death of the protagonist 
(the right to change the ending is reserved in the name of capricious 
artistic freedom) (16). 
 
As we see, the author has set out to withhold even the most “natural” of 
narrative conclusions, the death of the hero; in fact, this promise itself, should 
the reader put too much faith in it, hangs loose, with the author being able to 
retract it if he so wishes. So what does this announcement tell us and what 
does it condemn us to? 
To answer this question, let us first ask what kind of endings were 
permitted in the classic novel from Cervantes onward3. After all, an important 
                                                                
3 For, apart from a couple of exceptions – such as Wilhelm Meister’s accomplished self-
cultivation in the Apprenticeship, Raskolnikov’s atonement in Crime and Punishment, or Pierre 
Bezukhov’s familial happiness in War and Peace – the European novel hardly seems to be a 
realm of happy endings. Admittedly, this does not apply for the English novel of the “imperial 
century,” in which happy endings were a matter of course; perhaps this is why continental 
Europeans could never truly come to terms with the “narrative pragmatism” of Charles Dickens 
or Jane Austen. However, even in the most tragic finales of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
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reason for Don Quixote being considered a paradigmatic novelistic narrative 
featuring a prototypical modern hero lies precisely in the fact that it explicates 
a new form of ending the story. As Lukács claimed in The Theory of the 
Novel, it is “the problematic individual’s journeying towards himself,” i.e., 
the process of gaining self-knowledge by way of one’s life story, that reveals 
“the great difference between the discrete, unlimited nature of the material of 
the novel and the continuum-like infinity of the material of the epic. [...] The 
novel overcomes its ‘bad’ infinity by recourse to the biographical form” 
(Lukács, 1971: 81). Of course, Cervantes’s narrative technique is still partly 
mired in the world gone by, that is, in the tradition of the medieval chivalric 
romance; Don Quixote enacts his willful incompatibility with the world, his 
imagined chivalric honor, through a lengthy, at times tiresome series of 
episodes, which give the impression that they could go on forever. According 
to Lukács, Cervantes avoided this predicament only by adopting the parodic 
form. It is because of it that Don Quixote disposes with another lever, the 
unravelling of which can at last produce an actual modern ending of the story: 
this lever is, of course, the hero’s comical stature, unfolding in the gap 
between the “idea of chivalry” and the prosaic mundanity of the world. 
Cervantes’s world is already “disenchanted” enough that, coming in collision 
with it, even the ideality of the hero’s soul may go up in smoke at some point, 
thereby allowing the narrative arc to close. Competing at a tournament, the 
hero is vanquished by the Knight of the White Moon, who orders the loser to 
do penance by returning home. Once at home, the protagonist falls ill and 
enters a deep slumber; when he wakes up, he is no longer the sublime Don 
Quixote but only the common man, Alonso Quijano. “[A]nd one of the signs 
by which they conjectured he was dying,” Cervantes writes in a wonderful 
phrase, “was, his passing, by so easy and sudden a transition, from mad to 
sober” (Cervantes, 1992: 940). This is the crucial shift that finally makes it 
possible for this thousand-page-long colossus to come to an end: from behind 
the self-aggrandizing and therefore comical Quixote steps the small, profane, 
somewhat tragic Quijano. As observed by many theorists of the novel, the 
novelistic narrative arrives at its conclusion at the point in which a negative 
space opens up inside the hero that can be occupied by the reality of the 
ordinary world. The ending takes place when the ideals of the heart retreat, 
                                                                
literature, the great deaths in Stendhal and Balzac, or the famous suicides in Goethe, Flaubert, 
Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy, the world still posed as a substantial background to the hero’s 
ruination. Life might not have had enough meaning to promise happiness, but there was still 
enough of it there to finish our stories at least in an unhappy way. And the world could still 
coalesce into a contrastive setting for the aberrant path of the hero, a path that, albeit at the cost 




enabling high-flown interiority to succumb to and become level with the 
pressures of prosaic exteriority. 
The one who probably articulated this negative space at the heart of the 
modern hero in the most formally perfected, to a degree even cold, but at the 
same time logically and esthetically convincing manner was Goethe in his 
famous Bildungsroman Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship; he called it 
“inaptitude.” Despite the occasionally episodic structure, he devised the final 
version of the Apprenticeship so that the entire narrative would be drawn 
towards Meister’s final sacrifice, his famous Entsagung. The innermost core 
of Wilhelm’s personality is his love of theater; the first, unfinished version of 
the novel was actually titled Wilhelm Meisters theatralische Sendung, and the 
protagonist is, after all, also Shakespeare’s namesake. However, towards the 
end of the book, there is a conversation in which a friend has a few sobering 
words to share with Wilhelm: 
 
“I think,” said Jarno, “that you should abandon your association with 
the theater, for you have no talent for it.” 
Wilhelm was thunderstruck. He had to compose himself, for Jarno’s 
harsh words had deeply offended his self-esteem. “If you can convince 
me of that,” he said with a forced smile, “you will be doing me a great 
service, though it is always sad to be shaken out of a pleasant dream” 
(Goethe, 1989: 287). 
 
This short dialogue, which Goethe, in his unassuming elegance, expands 
into a broader scene focusing on other things, might well be one of the great 
passages of world literature. The element that creates enough negativity to 
harbor the ending of the story is the hero’s insight into his own ordinariness. 
His self-realization is further elevated and well-nigh consecrated in the 
famous scene of revelation, where the mysterious Turmgesellschaft, a sort of 
masonic lodge, lets him know, in some kind of ritual, that it had kept an eye 
on him all throughout his maturation, but did not want to intervene in his 
journey because he had to take each step on his own. Meister’s Bildung, his 
“self-cultivation,” is complete when he sacrifices the very thing that he 
treasures most, that is, when he terminates his acting career, dissolves the 
theater company, marries, and devotes himself to his newfound son. And this 
is the aspect that Lukács’s typology of the “novel of synthesis,” which is in 
part critical of Goethe, may have failed to point out. Although the 
Apprenticeship does in fact stand out in the tradition of the European novel 
due to its unusually happy ending, the price to be paid for this happiness is 
the highest possible; the hero’s sacrifice is nevertheless total. 
Given their inner monotony and dullness, Flaubert’s Emma Bovary, 
Frédéric Moreau, and Bouvard and Pécuchet are definitely Meister’s 
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successors. The Sentimental Education, in particular, could be interpreted as 
the final realization of Wilhelm Meister expanded onto five hundred pages. 
As such, Flaubert’s masterpiece, probably the most perfect literary work ever 
created, provides nothing short of an unhurried and exceptionally refined 
insight into the banal heart of the heart. The main protagonist Frédéric is too 
lazy to finish his studies, not decisive enough to not love other women besides 
his one great love, too tired to act on his suicidal thoughts, and too distracted 
to mourn his own child. Only when his sentimental passion is finally 
extinguished does he look back on his life, reminiscing together with his 
friend Deslauriers. Submerged in bourgeois everyday tedium, they remember 
their failed attempt to visit a brothel, which, in its unremarkable mundanity, 
proves to be the most beautiful event of their lives. The only thing that can 
cut through the ubiquitous narrative entropy and put a full stop at the end of 
the book is a random anecdote, an occurrence that previously had no narrative 
significance whatsoever. 
Where, on the contrary, the protagonist cannot bear to look into the 
emptiness inside, and is unable to exchange its poetry for the prose of the 
world, the only remaining ending is death. The heroes of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century novels thus preferred to finish by dying and, following the 
example set by Werther, frequently killed themselves: such was the fate of 
Bovary, Karenina, and Stavrogin. 
But the days of Lukács’s narrative finitability of the story were slowly 
coming to an end. We can observe a specific move in this direction already 
in Flaubert’s Bouvard and Pécuchet, which some would deem to be “the first 
modernist novel.” In the book, two middle-class, philistine Parisians, 
scriveners by profession, that is, bureaucrats and copyists of material written 
by others, retreat to a remote provincial abode in order to provide world 
history with another parodic repetition. In a sense, Flaubert’s novel seems to 
be nothing but an extensive testimony to the fact that nothing else will ever 
happen in this world. But it is precisely this completed and consummated 
world that will not allow the story to have an ending. When the heroes finally 
lose their will to live, the customary ending of the realist novel suddenly 
begins to recede. Self-realization, conciliation, self-cultivation, grand 
revelation, acceptance, disillusion, death, suicide – all of these events would 
be all too easy ways out of a world that has lost its purpose. Ironically enough, 
Flaubert passed away before he could finish the book, which is why the 
ending itself is only hinted at in a couple of meagre fragments. We find out 
that Bouvard and Pécuchet, independently of one another, each had the idea 
to once again take up their original profession of copying, as if everything 
had already been done and all that remained was to replicate past ideas. They 
order the carpenter to make them a double-counter desk, they purchase 
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notebooks, pens and erasers, and, as per the final paragraph: Ils s’y mettent, 
“They get to work” (Flaubert, 1910: 395; translation T. D.). Since there is 
nothing to hold the world together anymore, apparently there is also nothing 
left to do but “continue for the sake of continuation itself.” 
Thus, in 1880, Flaubert perhaps already opened the door to the twentieth 
century, which slowly began to develop the logic of infinity by way of 
depriving us of the traditional warranty that there will be an ending at the end. 
This new endlessness of modernity is no longer the positive infinity of the 
rich continuum of the epic world, but the negative infinitude of the inhibition 
of narrative denouement. At least in Kafka and Proust, downright 
programmatically in Beckett, but also in García Márquez, novels cannot end 
until they succeed in painting a convincing enough image of a certain 
ontological non-finitability. Kafka could not finish two (out of three) of his 
novels, Proust concluded his grand heptalogy only at the point in which time 
itself becomes timeless, Beckett’s novels are nothing but a vast effort to 
cultivate the grand immortality of small drives, and García Márquez usually 
puts an end to his narrative only at the point in which the prophecy produces 
its fulfilment, thereby trapping the protagonists in a sort of perpetual and 
viscous circularity of this world rather than the next. We have to ask, though: 
What is the real reason behind this invention of infinity? Is it possible to 
define what it is in the twentieth-century novel that might represent the 
structural analogue to the shift by which Don Quixote transformed back into 
Alonso Quijano and Wilhelm Meister discovered the lack of talent in his own 
innermost essence? And could it be explained why this shift no longer 
promises an ending but condemns the narrative to infinity? 
Kafka could be the one who developed and thought through this “logic of 
unending” most rigorously, consummately, and perhaps even schematically. 
The Trial is his only “relatively finished” novel, and its ending – as “two 
gentlemen” come looking for Josef K., abduct him from his home, take him 
out of town, and execute him – could momentarily indeed appear to offer a 
somewhat premature exit from an oppressive, essentially non-finitable 
Kafkian universe of indeterminable guilt and eternal trial. But being the 
genius that he is, Kafka closes the book with the suggestion that, in this world, 
not even death will bestow upon the hero the dignity of an ending: 
 
But the hands of one of the men were placed on K.’s throat, whilst the 
other plunged the knife into his heart and turned it round twice. As his 
sight faded, K. saw the two men leaning cheek to cheek close to his 
face as they observed the final verdict. “Like a dog!” he said. It seemed 




Thus, one might ask, what has the world lost that we seem to shamefully 
and grievously outlive even our own deaths? The answer to this question 
might well be found in one of the emblematic scenes of twentieth-century 
literature. When K. in Kafka’s The Castle gets close enough to the castle, he 
sees that it is 
 
neither an old knightly castle from the days of chivalry, nor a showy 
new structure, but an extensive complex of buildings, a few of them 
with two storeys, but many of them lower and crowded close together. 
If you hadn’t known it was a castle you might have taken it for a small 
town. [...] 
But as he came closer he thought the castle disappointing; after all, it 
was only a poor kind of collection of cottages assembled into a little 
town, and distinguished only by the fact that, while it might all be built 
of stone, the paint had flaked off long ago, and the stone itself seemed 
to be crumbling away (Kafka, 2009b: 11). 
 
From behind the great Quixote there ultimately emerged the small 
Quijano, and perhaps there are some similarities here with the bleak reality 
of low and narrow cottages coming to light from behind the symbolic screen 
of the “Castle.” Even so, while Cervantes places the utmost denudation of the 
hero only at the very end of the book, Kafka’s “desublimation of the objective 
structure of the world,” so to speak, happens practically at the beginning. And 
it is precisely this negative initiation that marks the point in which K.’s 
seemingly simple task truly becomes infinite. Although it is now the world 
that has lost something, this fact no longer liberates the protagonist, but rather 
obliges and forever binds him. The Castle is not unreachable because it is too 
sacred but because it is too secular. Just as ever new doors reveal themselves 
behind the door of the Law, stretching into infinity, K.’s step begins to 
endlessly falter on his way to the castle since the purpose of his task can no 
longer be consolidated into a final objective. The world turns out to be utterly 
ontologically inconsistent, thereby condemning the hero to an eternity in the 
purgatory of an essentially “negative” infinity. 
It is this structure, in which the framework of being dissolves and 
consequently commits the protagonist to a state of a true ending infinitely 
eluding him, that could represent the link that binds together literary worlds 
as disparate as those created by Kafka and Proust. In Proust, the gloomy and 
oppressive exterior structures, which interpellate Kafka’s characters, are 
substituted with an emasculated and spoiled neurasthenic I, one who spends 
his days mostly in bed. Nonetheless, his hypochondria is no less precipitous 
than Kafka’s trials and tribunals. In this egotistical universe, the function of 
the “ultimate screen of being” is thus assumed by the famous Proustian le 
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grand moi, the big I. The sole purpose of its preoccupation with itself, 
however, is a gradual revelation of the utter absence of a substantial 
psychological “personality” behind the phenomena of involuntary memories. 
Reading the famous definition of the ego from Albertine disparue, for 
example, this I could well be recognized as a subjectivist version of Kafka’s 
Law, that is, as a door that opens to ever new doors: 
 
Our ego is composed of the superimposition of our successive states. 
But this superimposition is not unalterable like the stratification of a 
mountain. Incessant upheavals raise to the surface ancient deposits 
(Proust, 2006: 893). 
 
Because memories no longer revolve around a “psychic” core with a solid, 
unified, and unidirectional biography, but rather continuously shift according 
to the involuntary impulses triggered by random exterior causes, “narrative 
time” is unlikely to be sutured by “biographical” events, such as insights and 
disappointments, meetings and breakups, births and deaths. Nonetheless, 
Proust seems to bridle this constant disintegration of traditional narration at 
one point and balances it out with an exceptional move: time, being precisely 
the measure which ceaselessly prevents the world from conforming to any 
possible metaphysical frame of meaning, ultimately reaches its apotheosis 
and becomes Time with a capital T. When in a somewhat overlooked but 
probably critical scene from the last of the seven books of Remembrance, 
Time Regained, the elderly characters meet in the little Empire salon of the 
Guermantes family, time becomes Time incarnate in the arms of Mme. de 
Sainte-Euverte, a thing among real-world things: 
 
She little knew that she had given birth to a new development of 
that name of Sainte-Euverte which, at so many intervals, marked 
the distance and continuity of Time. It was Time she was rocking 
in that cradle where the name of Sainte-Euverte flowered in a 
fuchsia-red silk in the Empire style. [...] to me it represented the 
function of cradling time in that room full of temporal associations. 
(1266–67) 
 
And it is the time of the cosmic decline of things, which becomes Time 
incarnate in a self-referential turn, that finally represents the force strong 
enough to charge the protagonist, who is twice referred to as Marcel, with 
recording everything that has happened. As written in the final paragraph of 
the megalomaniacal opus, it appears that through the passing of time with a 
lowercase T, we become obligated by Time with a capital T. Consequently, 
we are caught in a paradoxical position between the passing of real time and 
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the simultaneous infinitization of ideal Time, so that the approach toward 
death, it would seem, only stretches out the landscape of immortality: 
 
If at least, time enough were allotted to me to accomplish my work, I 
would not fail to mark it with the seal of Time, the idea of which 
imposed itself upon me with so much force today, and I would therein 
describe men, if need be, as monsters occupying a place in Time 
infinitely more important than the restricted one reserved for them in 
space, a place, on the contrary, prolonged immeasurably since, 
simultaneously touching widely separated years and the distant 
periods they have lived through – between which so many days have 
ranged themselves – they stand like giants immersed in Time. (395–
396) 
 
Within this structure, death can no longer perform its erstwhile function 
in the scope of which universal Time allowed for the personal, private ending 
of time; instead, it merely marks the real boundary of time where boundless 
Time is on the verge of revealing itself4. 
Our next example is James Joyce, the third great modernist besides Kafka 
and Proust. However, due to lack of space and our limited knowledge of the 
case his contribution to the same logic must remain conjecture. Of course, 
Ulysses is a variation on the very tale of the West which has always been 
considered paradigmatic of the possibility of an epic ending (among others 
by Lukács), i.e., Odysseus’s return to Penelope. At the end of the day, Bloom 
returns home and lies down by the feet of his wife, Molly. She wakes up, 
however, and drowsily recounts the impressions and experiences of the day 
in her famous inner monologue, which brings the book to a conclusion. 
Everything that “ended” throughout the day is repeated in a free flow of 
associations, as a formless, boundless, endless series of words without 
punctuation. It seems, thus, that the end of the day nevertheless produces its 
nocturnal infinity, ultimately emphasized by the reiteration of the word Yes, 
which stands both at the beginning and the end of the monologue, as if 
enclosing it into a different, emergent, self-contained world: “Yes because he 
never did a thing like that before …” (Joyce, 1992: 871) “… and yes I said 
yes I will Yes” (933)5. 
                                                                
4 Even autobiographically, Proust, who was terminally ill and made great haste to finish the 
last of the seven books in time, seems to have sensed that he was being persecuted by an end-
time, in which he must complete the task of infinite Time. 




It is worth noting that Slovene literature also contributed to this 
infinitization at the edge of the “end of the story.” Already in 1904, that is, 
before the great European modernists, Ivan Cankar published The Ward of 
Our Lady of Mercy [Hiša Marije Pomočnice], in our opinion the greatest 
novel on the non-existence of death ever written. It is set in a hospice for 
young girls with incurable diseases, so that the entirety of narrative time 
extends only in waiting for death. But Cankar – and in this respect, he is no 
lesser writer than Kafka or Proust – is capable of demonstrating that it is 
precisely within the horizon of impending death that some kind of absolute 
inertia of time unfolds. In this almshouse, there might be no more life, but 
there is also no death, no seasons, no days and years to be counted, and no 
solid boundary between this world and the next, only a fuzzy and porous one, 
which can seemingly be crossed either way so that some girls have already 
been to the other side and back. Finally, in some similarity to Proust’s Time, 
Death itself incarnates and, without causing a stir, lives among the girls as an 
indifferent but kind old woman6. 
To continue with our examples of this structure combining the 
inconsistency of the world and the concurrent infinity of the hero’s inner 
disposition, the most obvious, downright programmatic case is certainly 
Samuel Beckett. In his work, the “non-existence of the world,” the fact that 
everything has come to an end, that the spirit is no more, and that nature does 
not exist, is an elementary fact, an entry condition of a sort. The trilogy 
Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable shows characters who are already 
completely isolated, dislocated, even immobilized. They are slowly losing 
touch with the outside world, they are witnessing the creeping deterioration 
of their own bodies, and all they are trying to do is to die. But it is because 
there is nothing left of the world except waiting for death that death cannot 
arrive; instead, it pushes the protagonists into its indefinite deferral by 
endlessly producing words. Beckett’s literary universe is ultimately nothing 
but an expansive testimony of the fact that everything has come to an end so 
utterly that not even an ending can materialize anymore. This is Mladen 
Dolar’s take on this author; he interpreted Beckett’s reduction of the language 
and the body of the protagonist as a kind of deduction of the irreducibility of 
his unsilenceable voice: 
 
Beckett’s protagonists are always and ever more so on the verge of 
death [...]. They have exhausted all the possibilities but cannot die. 
The end is constantly receding. It seems as though death would 
redeem them, it is everything they desire, but in this space of the end 
                                                                
6 See (Cankar, 1976). 
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eluding them there is a loop [...]; in this loop of being at the edge of 
nothingness they step into a kind of space of ‘immortality’ [...]. (Dolar, 
2007: 36; translation T. D.) 
 
Thus, in the frequently cited, and long, final sentence of The Unnamable, a 
sort of hindmost physical residuum of the “hero” finally says: “[Y]ou must 
go on, I can’t go on, you must go on, I’ll go on, you must say words, as long 
as there are any—until they find me, until they say me”; and then, a couple 
of lines later, “you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on” (Beckett, 1994: 418). 
A most specific answer to the modernist inhibition of the story coming to 
an end was given by Gabriel García Márquez, perhaps the last author to have 
constructed his own “literary ontology,” comparable with Proust’s 
remembrances and Kafka’s tribunals. One of the fundamental features of 
García Márquez’s world is a certain compulsion, according to which the story 
may only end when it creates a loop by which it has always already ended. It 
is for this reason that his novels are so often structured as self-fulfilling 
prophecies. In One Hundred Years of Solitude, the last descendant of the 
Buendía family, Aureliano Babilonia, deciphers the mysterious parchments 
of Melquíades, which turn out to contain both the chronicle and the foretelling 
of the history of the village of Macondo. Just as Aureliano begins to read 
about the moment in which he is reading about this very moment, that is, 
when he himself becomes a part of the prophecy he is reading about, and then 
skips a couple of pages to find out the time and place of his death, he gets 
caught in a city of mirrors destroyed by wind—in a way, the hero skips over 
his own death by becoming trapped in the instance in which death will never 
quite arrive. 
The form of the time loop, in which the symbolic frame precedes the real 
fulfillment and is yet to produce its actualization, provided the title to one of 
García Márquez’s most accomplished and refined works, his Chronicle of a 
Death Foretold, a novel about the torturous realization of something that had 
been predicted in words. Two brothers are bound to avenge the honor of their 
sister and kill the man she falsely claims took her virginity; although the 
brothers do everything in their power to let the wrongly accused escape his 
fate, the fatalism of the Caribbean renders it so that they finally do murder 
him nonetheless. An ending is thus possible, but only if it has been told before 
it ever had a chance to happen. However, since the ending is merely an 
“earthly” incarnation of the fact that everything has always already been told 
somewhere, its function is precisely not to disentangle the plot and provide 
an exit out of the situation; instead, it heralds perpetual entrapment within it. 
It is here that the essential this-worldliness, “layness,” and secularity of 
Latin American “magic realism” shows its face. Perhaps its magic is not to 
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be interpreted as some kind of re-enchantment of a progressively 
disillusioned world; instead, its function might rather resemble Kafka’s 
recognition of a row of cottages behind the screen of the Castle. The 
Márquezian marvel is the place where, behind the hope for transcendence, 
the ultimate attachment to the immanence of earthly existence is finally 
brought to light. When José Arcadio Buendía dies in One Hundred Years of 
Solitude, García Márquez paints a wonderful scene, worthy of the greatest 
authors of world literature: 
 
A short time later, when the carpenter was taking measurements for 
the coffin, through the window they saw a light rain of tiny yellow 
flowers falling. They fell on the town all through the night in a silent 
storm, and they covered the roofs and blocked the doors and 
smothered the animals who slept outdoors. So many flowers fell from 
the sky that in the morning the streets were carpeted with a compact 
cushion and they had to clear them away with shovels and rakes so 
that the funeral procession could pass by (García Márquez, 1971: 
139). 
 
Miracles are events that smother the animals, render the roads impassable, 
and press men down towards the ground; as such, they are nothing but 
instances of terrestrial immanence transpiring within celestial transcendence. 
This is why García Márquez’s magical cosmos is so sweaty, moist, muddy, 
and sticky, and this is why people in it suffer from boils and elephantiasis. 
Even death seems merely to mark the instance in which the journey to the 
other side proves to be utterly impossible. Let us quote the following passage: 
 
Pilar Ternera died in her wicker rocking chair during one night of 
festivities as she watched over the entrance to her paradise. In 
accordance with her last wishes she was not buried in a coffin but 
sitting in her rocker, which eight men lowered by ropes into a huge 
hole dug in the center of the dance floor. [...] It was the end. In Pilar 
Ternera’s tomb, among the psalm and cheap whore jewelry, the ruins 
of the past would rot … (382) 
 
After all, the famous “one hundred years of solitude” is but a name for 
being caught in this world and a measure of time of being trapped in one’s 
own prophecy: “Before reaching the final line, however, he [Aureliano 
Babilonia] had already understood that he would never leave that room [...], 
because races condemned to one hundred years of solitude did not have a 
second opportunity on earth.” (399) 
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It seems that each of these examples exhibits the same logic. From behind 
the screen of the “symbolic hypostasis of the world” emerges its 
inconsistency, and this very “metaphysical under-compensation,” so to 
speak, condemns the protagonist to narrative infinity. If in the traditional 
novel the “objective structure of the world” could somehow still fill the 
protagonist’s heart, or at least push him into death, the modernist novel 
discloses a world that lacks precisely the truth that could still conclude our 
stories. Not even death can bring any solace to the new hero; what now awaits 
him is no longer the blissful immortality of the other world, but instead a 
cyclical, arduous, and uneasy deathlessness of this one. The infinity of the 
twentieth century is neither cosmic infinitude nor divine eternity, but merely 
the negative absence of an ending, unfolding on the grounds of the thorough 
lack of any transcendental guarantees. 
Within these coordinates we can now embark on a reading of The 
Pianist’s Touch, a novel which we will interpret as an attempt to provide a 
new response to the twentieth-century prohibition that denied the story a 
proper ending. 
 
3 Does The Pianist’s Touch tell us something about the twenty-first 
century? 
 
Mirt Komel’s book recounts the story of Gabrijel Goldman, a brilliant 
pianist modelled after Glenn Gould. This choice alone is telling. One might 
ask: Why is the protagonist a pianist and why a genius? Where does this need 
for the absolute “subjective surplus” over the world, for genius, come from? 
The answer probably lies in the new landscape of the world gaining 
dominance in the twenty-first century. It seems as if the times of grand 
modernist extravagance, such as dark Kafkaesque oppression, Proustian 
hypochondriac megalomania, Beckettian apocalyptic scenarios, or 
Márquezian this-worldly viscous magic, are now over; instead, reality is 
somehow programmatically normalized and profaned until it becomes 
fundamentally trivial. With that in mind, Komel’s explicit stake is to try to 
paint a picture of a thoroughly disenchanted world, as in of the key passages 
of the novel depicting Gabriel’s first piano lesson: 
 
In accordance with his unrelenting dialectical materialism, the teacher 
was of the opinion that he must first explain the mechanics of the 
instrument to the student in order to avoid musical mysticism. [...] 
“See, there’s nothing magical to this tool, which man invented just as 
he invented the sword or the wheel. You have to master the technique 
in order to command the mechanics of the device, which will follow 
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your orders unconditionally” (Komel, 2015: 52). 
 
This most magical object of every pianist is thus reduced to a mere 
mechanism comprised of keys, hammers, and strings, a cluster of matter 
concealing no secrets underneath its shiny exterior. Moreover, the final truth 
of exhaustively mechanizing the world is that it finally forfeits the need for 
man, its creator. When Gabriel visits Steinway Hall, he is shown a self-
playing automaton: 
 
a greased up machine and its mechanically moving hammers, which 
pressed against the padded keys and moved other hammers hidden 
beneath the lid; [...]. 
This entire process of blindly hitting the keys, all this piano playing 
without a pianist inevitably reminded Gabrijel of the provocative 
question posed by his late teacher: “Music without a musician – the 
future of music?” (157–158) 
 
A certain shift seems to occur here compared to modernism. In Kafka, the 
doorkeeper standing before the “door of the Law” tells the dying man from 
the country that the door was built for him alone and that it will close when 
he dies; the disintegration of things in time calls upon Proust’s I to record 
their persistent recurrence in a memoire; in Beckett, the end of the world 
requires the incessant speaking of words; even in Márquez, prophecies 
prompt the protagonists to facilitate their fulfilment. Here, on the other hand, 
the world essentially no longer addresses the hero. Reality begins to show 
itself as commonplace, unremarkable, even routine-bound and vulgar, but its 
subsistence is already so thoroughly robbed of all metaphysical pretension 
that it can only pose as an immense enactment of the redundancy of man. 
It now appears that Komel conceived a counterweight to this ultimate 
disenchantment of the world in the shape of an element of re-enchantment. 
This element is the hero himself, Gabrijel Goldman, who, as the title of the 
book would suggest, is primarily characterized by two traits: a demonic 
relationship with music and an agonizing attitude towards touch. Against the 
background of an already self-evident dehumanization of the world emerges 
a hero who is sensitized to the point of madness and who marks his place in 
the world solely through a variety of obsessions: on the one hand, he listens 
to the voice of his inner daemon, which drives him to play the piano, while 
on the other, he meticulously avoids being touched by anything belonging to 
the outside world. 
Let us then take a quick look at the genesis and narrative function of this 
literary character. For it is his role of the lever of narrative infinity that defines 
the coordinates within which the esthetic layers of Komel’s novel coincide: 
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the ironic style full of small diversions and reflexive passages evocative of 
Nabokov, as well as the non-linear, anecdotal narrative, the expansive 
temporal loops, the ephemeral, almost surreal love story, and finally the two 
principal motifs, music and touch. So, where does the central theme of the 
novel originate from? Why music and touch, specifically? In today’s 
predominantly visual world, which is deemed to be “post-metaphysical” and 
“economically determined,” why should one still write novels about pianists 
and their tactile phobias? 
Music and touch are in fact chosen as the very media capable of 
performing their own immaterialist turn, the move into silence and 
intangibility. The ultimate purpose of Goldman’s playing, especially his 
concerts, is, paradoxically, to produce silence as the sole authentic effect of 
music, the only element in which the protagonist can exist. If, for example, 
Gabrijel wears black to perform a piano concert, this is because one must 
“‘always pay one’s respects to the immortal passing of music, which, unlike 
a painting or a statue, always dies off into untouchable silence after the last 
bar is played.’” (115) So it is music, and music alone, that enables Gabrijel 
to concentrate that experience which living in the real world never fully 
allows: namely, to be absolutely untouched. The Pianist’s Touch is thus less 
a book about touch than the fear of it. On this account, it treats us to a veritable 
clinical history of haptic pathologies. Walking in the streets, for example, the 
protagonist is terrified of coming into contact with his fellow pedestrians, and 
when he is hospitalized, the sensation of a transfusion needle piercing his skin 
is unbearable. Music is probably the least mimetic and intentional art form, 
and it is precisely in its artistic absolutism that it receives its precise 
“narrative” function: it provides the hero with an ideal shield, which protects 
his transcendent interiority from any kind of outside breach. 
The literary world of the twentieth century still charged the hero with, or 
at least forced him into, the discomfort of a never-ending task; it still turned 
to him and appealed to him. The lever that gave the world this power was the 
difference between symbolic projection and its failure to materialize, that is, 
the difference between the Castle and the castle, the big I and the little I, 
Words and the unnamable, transcendence and immanence. Within this gap, 
narration became infinite, yet in this infinity the world still needed and, in a 
way, appointed the hero. In Komel, on the other hand, even the fundamental 
framework of reality, from behind which its disintegration may come to the 
fore, is gone. The material profanity of reality has become axiomatic. As we 
have seen, the piano is exposed as a mere array of keys, hammers, and strings 
in the very first music lesson – as opposed to Kafka, where the castle was at 
first still the Castle, the piano was never the Piano in Komel. And because 
even this minimal gap between the symbolic investiture and the shortfall of 
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reality is missing, the world, which Mirt Komel steadily describes as a 
shallow screen, a flattened aggregate of fleeting phenomena, can basically do 
nothing else but impotently wait for the hero’s brilliant accomplishments, his 
irrational bursts of piano performance motivated by no outside force 
whatsoever. 
It is this setting that harbors the reason for Goldman’s precarious, 
intangible, almost vampiric existence, which reduces his life to oscillation 
between two extremes: momentary inspiration and inner brilliance on the one 
hand, and protecting his untouchedness from outside things on the other. A 
considerable distinctive feature of the novel is precisely the consistent staging 
of scenes in which the ball is always in the court of the protagonist, never the 
world. The hero is thus no longer the modernist, Joycean, 
“phenomenological” subject, who absorbs outside impressions like a sponge, 
neither is he Musil’s “man without qualities” as the emptiest possible medium 
of social and historical dynamics, but rather a subject in the face of which the 
world loses its colors, shapes, and stories; confronting Gabrijel Goldman, it 
is the world that now becomes ohne Eigenschaften, without qualities, bland 
and featureless. Against the background of this total deflation of the outside 
world, one that never addresses the hero and in fact never even touches him 
anymore, the protagonist is becoming his own self only through impulses that 
are absolutely internal. 
The function of music thus becomes evident enough; it acts as the medium 
of untouchability which the hero needs in order to preserve his “non-
narrativity” among the minor stories of his world. The novel draws up an 
entire series of narrative sets, only for them to remain passing, unfinished 
sketches. Such are, for example, the family milieu featuring a rich, ambitious 
father and sensitive mother, a professional ascent which puts the hero in an 
environment fraught with up-and-comers and rivals, a diagnosis of time that 
mercilessly mechanizes everything, including music, and, last but not least, 
the love story with the phantom-like Esther, in which two otherwise 
untouchable beings fuse into one. But as we accompany Gabrijel Goldman 
on his walks through the hustle and bustle of the city, i.e., as he visits the city 
café, or during the barely tangible love scene, we get the feeling that all of 
these motifs serve neither the purpose of reconstructing a life story, 
recapitulating a coming-of-age, or providing some in-depth psychological 
analysis, nor the purpose of displaying a panoramic view of an entire age; 
instead, they merely constitute a contrastive background for the staging of the 
self-apotheosis of the hero, his perpetual irreducibility to the exterior 
conditions of the world. 
If, then, Don Quixote finally casts off his mask of knighthood and 
Wilhelm Meister sacrifices his innermost passion, the love of theater, 
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Goldman is merely becoming what he has always already been: a monument 
in a world without mystery. Even in early childhood he gives the impression 
of representing transcendence amidst immanence; when, for example, 
lightning strikes his family’s apartment and breaks a window, the flying 
pieces of glass miraculously leave the talented child unscathed: “Gabrijel sat 
there, among the countless pieces and hues of sharpness – untouched.” (38) 
In his unearthly inspiration he ensures a constant distancing from the 
possibility that the narrative stimuli might lead to the formation of a 
traditional story. Hence, the center of gravity between the hero and the world 
has changed places. Once, it was the world that did not allow the hero’s story 
to end, and now it is the hero who seems to prohibit the world from sliding 




The question is, thus, how could a story in this thoroughly anti-narrative 
and non-mythical universe come to an end. Do the occurrences around the 
hero amount to a story at all? Can his statuesque untouchability have any 
hope for a definite ending? Gabrijel Goldman is a living monument, who 
knows neither the beginning nor the end of time and is unable to reach with 
the world even the most extreme of compromises, the one to be allowed to 
die. This is why the choice of where to put the final stop is all the more 
precarious. And it is here that Mirt Komel makes the possibly most confident 
and commanding move of the entire book: in the final act, the pianist becomes 
a composer, who burns his premiere work. Of course, it appears as though 
the writer uses the figure of the genius solely because it represents a semi-
permeable membrane of a sort; whereas he never permits the world to reach 
inside him, the genius always has the right to release his brilliance upon the 
world. On the last pages of the book, the previously as yet uncontrolled bursts 
of piano playing retreat and make room for the creation of a new, never before 
heard composition. Above, we claimed that the twentieth-century novel is all 
about making a story unendable; here, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, the levers of this endlessness are transposed into the protagonist’s 
interiority, the infinite self-referentiality of his ingenuity. This is why the 
concluding point of The Pianist’s Touch might be read as the last, ultimate 
endeavor to preserve the instance of the infinity of creation. When Goldman 
composes his first work, Un quasi qualcosa, he winces at the thought that 
“his life could be written down as musical notation, in the form of those little 
lines and heads and bars.” (176) Being altogether untouchable, he is at great 
pains to come to terms with the fact that something as unworldly as creation 
ends up in the materiality of a written record; perhaps he shudders at the 
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thought that at the margin of the ink put down on paper inspiration finally 
does meet its “end.” Kafka’s phantasmatic castle is only a crowd of huddled 
little cottages, and the artwork is ultimately nothing but a sequence of dead 
signs on paper. This is why, in the final sentence of the book, Goldman “set 
fire to the papers, lifted them like a torch, walked to the window and opened 
it, and then extended his arm and opened his hand so that the paper 
transformed into an ashy butterfly flapping its wings into nothingness.” (176) 
What elevates Goldman to the status of literary hero is not so much the fact 
that he is a genius, but that he is an inventor who destroys his own invention. 
He might be “condemned to creation,” but his creation is finally nothing other 
than nothingness itself. Just as K. halts in front of the image of a disenchanted 
castle, so the final act of a genius who deprives the world of an ending to the 
story is merely a return to the spot one step prior to the materialization of the 
artwork, that is, to the place where the moment of creation is still infinite. 
Interestingly enough, there is a scene at the beginning of the novel which, 
in its refined mundanity, already foreshadows this kind of ending, albeit in 
far more modest terms. One might even say that this rapport with his mother 
represents the very initiation of Komel’s hero: 
 
he always saw his mother happy and smiling, and he ascribed her good 
mood to the fact that she always kept singing to herself. [...] He also 
couldn’t see that she often retreated away from him in sadness, hiding 
her tears with a smile as she was gripped by panicked desperation 
because she didn’t know what to do with the child who, as he was 
growing older, showed ever more uncontrollable and scary fits of 
something nobody could understand. (22) 
 
And it almost seems as if the only thing that remains for us to do in this 
stale, insipid, hollowed out world of the twenty-first century is to perpetually 
hum to oneself. 
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